CVE-2025-13151 — CVE-2025-13151

Affected: GnuTLS libtasn1

Stack-based buffer overflow in libtasn1 version: v4.20.0. The function fails to validate the size of input data resulting in a buffer overflow in asn1_expend_octet_string.

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq — jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

Affected: Maven: tools.jackson.core:jackson-core, Maven: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core

### Summary The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

### Details The root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks. - After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`. - The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

### PoC The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

```java package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org…

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CVE-2025-13151 — CVE-2025-13151

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq — jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition