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      <title>GHSA-vvgj-x9jq-8cj9 — quic-go: HTTP/3 QPACK Trailer Expansion Memory Exhaustion</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vvgj-x9jq-8cj9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/quic-go/quic-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large trailer field section with many unique field names and/or large values. The implementation builds an `http.Header` for the corresponding `http.Request` or `http.Response`, while only enforcing limits on the size of the QPACK-compressed HEADERS frame, not on the decoded field section. This can lead to memory exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is very similar to CVE-2025-64702. The difference is that this issue uses HTTP trailers, rather than HTTP headers, as the attack vector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 servers or clients by triggering excessive memory allocation, potentially leading to crashes or resource exhaustion. This affects both servers and clients due to symmetric header construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In HTTP/3, field sections are compressed using QPACK (RFC 9204). Field sections are used for both HTTP headers and trailers. quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 server and client decode the QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame into header fields, then construct an `http.Request` or `http.Response`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`http3.Server.MaxHeaderBytes` and `http3.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes` limit the encoded HEADERS frame size, with defaults of 1 MB for servers and 10 MB for clients. However, they did not limit the decoded field section size. A maliciously crafted HEADERS f…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/quic-go/quic-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large trailer field section with many unique field names and/or large values. The implementation builds an `http.Header` for the corresponding `http.Request` or `http.Response`, while only enforcing limits on the size of the QPACK-compressed HEADERS frame, not on the decoded field section. This can lead to memory exhaustion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is very similar to CVE-2025-64702. The difference is that this issue uses HTTP trailers, rather than HTTP headers, as the attack vector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 servers or clients by triggering excessive memory allocation, potentially leading to crashes or resource exhaustion. This affects both servers and clients due to symmetric header construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In HTTP/3, field sections are compressed using QPACK (RFC 9204). Field sections are used for both HTTP headers and trailers. quic-go&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 server and client decode the QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame into header fields, then construct an `http.Request` or `http.Response`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`http3.Server.MaxHeaderBytes` and `http3.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes` limit the encoded HEADERS frame size, with defaults of 1 MB for servers and 10 MB for clients. However, they did not limit the decoded field section size. A maliciously crafted HEADERS f…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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