GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4 — go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

Affected: Go: github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2

# Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client

## Summary

go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions.

## Affected Component

| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **File** | `metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go` | | **Function** | `(*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error` | | **Callsite** | `metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName)` (around line 129 at the pinned commit) |

## Impact

When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment.

> **Note:** Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue.

## Attacker Model

- Attacker…

Most recent entries from all

GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4 — go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names