https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:38:03 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-frvp-7c67-39w9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @hono/node-server</p> <p>The same as the `hono` core [Path traversal in `serve-static` on Windows via encoded backslash (`%5C`)](https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-wwfh-h76j-fc44).</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>On Windows hosts, an encoded backslash (`%5C`) in the request path decodes to `\`, which the Windows path resolver treats as a separator. `serve-static` then resolves a single URL segment such as `admin\secret.txt` into a nested file under the root and serves it, letting an attacker read static files meant to be protected behind prefix-mounted middleware. Directory escape (`..`) remains blocked.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The router splits paths only on `/`, so `/admin%5Csecret.txt` is one segment and middleware on `/admin/*` does not run. The `serve-static` guard rejects `.`/`..` and consecutive separators but lets a lone `\` through; on Windows the file resolver re-splits it into the protected subtree.</p> <p>This affects Windows hosts serving static files via the Node, Bun, or Deno adapters that guard a static subtree with prefix-mounted middleware.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An unauthenticated attacker can read static files under a middleware-guarded prefix on Windows hosts. The read stays within the configured root; escape outside the root is not possible.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @hono/node-server</p> <p>The same as the `hono` core [Path traversal in `serve-static` on Windows via encoded backslash (`%5C`)](https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-wwfh-h76j-fc44).</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>On Windows hosts, an encoded backslash (`%5C`) in the request path decodes to `\`, which the Windows path resolver treats as a separator. `serve-static` then resolves a single URL segment such as `admin\secret.txt` into a nested file under the root and serves it, letting an attacker read static files meant to be protected behind prefix-mounted middleware. Directory escape (`..`) remains blocked.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The router splits paths only on `/`, so `/admin%5Csecret.txt` is one segment and middleware on `/admin/*` does not run. The `serve-static` guard rejects `.`/`..` and consecutive separators but lets a lone `\` through; on Windows the file resolver re-splits it into the protected subtree.</p> <p>This affects Windows hosts serving static files via the Node, Bun, or Deno adapters that guard a static subtree with prefix-mounted middleware.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An unauthenticated attacker can read static files under a middleware-guarded prefix on Windows hosts. The read stays within the configured root; escape outside the root is not possible.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-frvp-7c67-39w9