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      <title>GHSA-98qh-xjc8-98pq — pgjdbc: Unbounded PBKDF2 iterations in SCRAM authentication allows CPU exhaustion DoS</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-98qh-xjc8-98pq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.postgresql:postgresql&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count.
With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail.
A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, `loginTimeout` did not fully mitigate this problem. When `loginTimeout` expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects availability. It does **not** provide authentication bypass, privilege escalation, or direct password disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user is vulnerable when **all** of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The connection uses **SCRAM-SHA-256** authentication.
2. The client reaches a **malicious, compromised, or attacker-controlled PostgreSQL endpoint**.
3. That endpoint sends a very large SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count in the `server-first-message`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, that can happen in these situations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the application lets end users or tenants supply their own database connection details (as in many BI, reporting, analytics, ETL, and low-code platforms), so a user can point the shared client host at a server they control
- the application accepts connection str…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.postgresql:postgresql&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count.
With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail.
A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In affected versions, `loginTimeout` did not fully mitigate this problem. When `loginTimeout` expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects availability. It does **not** provide authentication bypass, privilege escalation, or direct password disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user is vulnerable when **all** of the following are true:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The connection uses **SCRAM-SHA-256** authentication.
2. The client reaches a **malicious, compromised, or attacker-controlled PostgreSQL endpoint**.
3. That endpoint sends a very large SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count in the `server-first-message`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, that can happen in these situations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the application lets end users or tenants supply their own database connection details (as in many BI, reporting, analytics, ETL, and low-code platforms), so a user can point the shared client host at a server they control
- the application accepts connection str…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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