https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:25:42 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/envoyproxy/gateway</p> <p>Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.</p> <p>**Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL - sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway) - No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code)</p> <p>**Description**</p> <p>getFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a raw gzip.Reader (httpfetcher.go:216) with no output bound, while the compressed input is capped at 256 MiB (httpfetcher.go:139). The bytes originate from a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1077 → cache.go:248 → httpfetcher.go:147 → :233), so an untrusted tenant can point at a ~10 MiB gzip-of-zeros and force ~10 GiB allocation in the shared controller process. All candidate guards execute either before the body is buffered or after decompression. OOM-kills, restarts, re-reconciles same CR, crash-loops — persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage with PR:L/AC:L and scope change → HIGH despite availability-only.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/envoyproxy/gateway</p> <p>Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.</p> <p>**Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL - sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway) - No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code)</p> <p>**Description**</p> <p>getFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a raw gzip.Reader (httpfetcher.go:216) with no output bound, while the compressed input is capped at 256 MiB (httpfetcher.go:139). The bytes originate from a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1077 → cache.go:248 → httpfetcher.go:147 → :233), so an untrusted tenant can point at a ~10 MiB gzip-of-zeros and force ~10 GiB allocation in the shared controller process. All candidate guards execute either before the body is buffered or after decompression. OOM-kills, restarts, re-reconciles same CR, crash-loops — persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage with PR:L/AC:L and scope change → HIGH despite availability-only.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cxpq-8v7q-cg56