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      <title>GHSA-x6wf-f3px-wcqx — xmldom has XML node injection through unvalidated processing instruction serialization</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x6wf-f3px-wcqx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence `?&amp;gt;`. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in the DOM construction and serialization flow for processing instruction nodes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` is called, the supplied `data` string is stored directly on the node without validation. Later, when the document is serialized, the serializer writes PI nodes by concatenating `&amp;lt;?`, the target, a space, `node.data`, and `?&amp;gt;` directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That behavior is unsafe because processing instructions are a syntax-sensitive context. The closing delimiter `?&amp;gt;` terminates the PI. If attacker-controlled input contains `?&amp;gt;`, the serializer does not preserve it as literal PI content. Instead, it emits output where the remainder of the payload is treated as live XML markup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same class of vulnerability was previously addressed for CDATA sections (GHSA-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp / CVE-2026-34601), where `]]&amp;gt;` in CDATA data was handled by splitting. The serializer applies no equivalent protection to processing instruction data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`lib/dom.js` — `createProcessingInstruction` (lines 2240–2246):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
createProcessingInstruction: function (target, data) {
    var node = new ProcessingInstruction(PDC);
    node.ownerDocumen…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence `?&amp;gt;`. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in the DOM construction and serialization flow for processing instruction nodes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` is called, the supplied `data` string is stored directly on the node without validation. Later, when the document is serialized, the serializer writes PI nodes by concatenating `&amp;lt;?`, the target, a space, `node.data`, and `?&amp;gt;` directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That behavior is unsafe because processing instructions are a syntax-sensitive context. The closing delimiter `?&amp;gt;` terminates the PI. If attacker-controlled input contains `?&amp;gt;`, the serializer does not preserve it as literal PI content. Instead, it emits output where the remainder of the payload is treated as live XML markup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same class of vulnerability was previously addressed for CDATA sections (GHSA-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp / CVE-2026-34601), where `]]&amp;gt;` in CDATA data was handled by splitting. The serializer applies no equivalent protection to processing instruction data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`lib/dom.js` — `createProcessingInstruction` (lines 2240–2246):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
createProcessingInstruction: function (target, data) {
    var node = new ProcessingInstruction(PDC);
    node.ownerDocumen…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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