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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-68121 — Unexpected session resumption in crypto/tls</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68121</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library crypto/tls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During session resumption in crypto/tls, if the underlying Config has its ClientCAs or RootCAs fields mutated between the initial handshake and the resumed handshake, the resumed handshake may succeed when it should have failed. This may happen when a user calls Config.Clone and mutates the returned Config, or uses Config.GetConfigForClient. This can cause a client to resume a session with a server that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake, or cause a server to resume a session with a client that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library crypto/tls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During session resumption in crypto/tls, if the underlying Config has its ClientCAs or RootCAs fields mutated between the initial handshake and the resumed handshake, the resumed handshake may succeed when it should have failed. This may happen when a user calls Config.Clone and mutates the returned Config, or uses Config.GetConfigForClient. This can cause a client to resume a session with a server that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake, or cause a server to resume a session with a client that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68121</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mqqf-5wvp-8fh8 — chi has an open redirect vulnerability in the RedirectSlashes middleware</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqqf-5wvp-8fh8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RedirectSlashes` function in middleware/strip.go does not perform correct input validation and can lead to an open redirect vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RedirectSlashes` function performs a `Trim` to all forward slash (`/`) characters, while prepending a single one at the begining of the path (Line 52).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, it does not trim backslashes (`\`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
File: middleware/strip.go
41: func RedirectSlashes(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
...
51: 			// Trim all leading and trailing slashes (e.g., &amp;#34;//evil.com&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/some/path//&amp;#34;)
52: 			path = &amp;#34;/&amp;#34; + strings.Trim(path, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
...
62: }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also, from version 5.2.2 onwards the `RedirectSlashes` function does not take into consideration the `Host` Header in the redirect response returned. This was done in order to combat another [[vulnerability](https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93)](https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above make it possible for a response in the following form:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /\evil.com
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/\evil.com` will be transformed by most browsers (Chrome, Firefox, etc. not Safari) into `//evil.com` which is a protocol relative URL and will result in a redirect to `evil.com`, essentially making it an open redirect vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A minimal working example can be seen below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
package main&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;import (
	&amp;#34;fmt&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;net/http&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/go-chi/chi/v5&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middle…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RedirectSlashes` function in middleware/strip.go does not perform correct input validation and can lead to an open redirect vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RedirectSlashes` function performs a `Trim` to all forward slash (`/`) characters, while prepending a single one at the begining of the path (Line 52).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, it does not trim backslashes (`\`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
File: middleware/strip.go
41: func RedirectSlashes(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
...
51: 			// Trim all leading and trailing slashes (e.g., &amp;#34;//evil.com&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/some/path//&amp;#34;)
52: 			path = &amp;#34;/&amp;#34; + strings.Trim(path, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
...
62: }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also, from version 5.2.2 onwards the `RedirectSlashes` function does not take into consideration the `Host` Header in the redirect response returned. This was done in order to combat another [[vulnerability](https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93)](https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-vrw8-fxc6-2r93).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above make it possible for a response in the following form:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /\evil.com
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/\evil.com` will be transformed by most browsers (Chrome, Firefox, etc. not Safari) into `//evil.com` which is a protocol relative URL and will result in a redirect to `evil.com`, essentially making it an open redirect vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A minimal working example can be seen below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
package main&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;import (
	&amp;#34;fmt&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;net/http&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/go-chi/chi/v5&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middle…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mqqf-5wvp-8fh8</guid>
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