<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 03:00:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6 — sigstore-go has a multi-log threshold bypass via single compromised log</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N&amp;gt;1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N&amp;gt;1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to v1.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N&amp;gt;1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N&amp;gt;1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to v1.1.5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
