https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:45:37 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/opencontainers/runc</p> <p>### Impact When setting up the container rootfs, `setupPtmx` and `setupDevSymlinks` call `os.Remove` and `os.Symlink` with a `filepath.Join` string which allow an image with `/dev` as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called `ptmx` on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory.</p> <p>Please note that this issue is not exploitable under Docker because [it creates a top-level `ro` layer that masks any malicious `/dev` symlink present in the container image](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/docker-v29.4.1/daemon/initlayer/setup_unix.go) (this is also done without mounting the lower layers so there is no opportunity for the malicious `/dev` symlink to trick it into resolving to some other path). Unfortunately, Podman and containerd&lt;sup&gt;&amp;dagger;&lt;/sup&gt; do not do this and so users using those higher-level runtimes with runc can be exploited via a malicious image.</p> <p>This issue mirrors a [somewhat similar issue in crun](https://github.com/containers/crun/security/advisories/GHSA-7vwr-4279-7gq5), which was also published recently.</p> <p>###### &amp;dagger; Actually, at the time the issue was analysed, [containerd had dead code that implemented this feature](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/v2.2.3/pkg/rootfs/init_linux.go) but the implementation contained several security issues that would arguably have made it more exploitable than in runc. Luckily, the code appears to have never been used (at l…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/opencontainers/runc</p> <p>### Impact When setting up the container rootfs, `setupPtmx` and `setupDevSymlinks` call `os.Remove` and `os.Symlink` with a `filepath.Join` string which allow an image with `/dev` as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called `ptmx` on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory.</p> <p>Please note that this issue is not exploitable under Docker because [it creates a top-level `ro` layer that masks any malicious `/dev` symlink present in the container image](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/docker-v29.4.1/daemon/initlayer/setup_unix.go) (this is also done without mounting the lower layers so there is no opportunity for the malicious `/dev` symlink to trick it into resolving to some other path). Unfortunately, Podman and containerd&lt;sup&gt;&amp;dagger;&lt;/sup&gt; do not do this and so users using those higher-level runtimes with runc can be exploited via a malicious image.</p> <p>This issue mirrors a [somewhat similar issue in crun](https://github.com/containers/crun/security/advisories/GHSA-7vwr-4279-7gq5), which was also published recently.</p> <p>###### &amp;dagger; Actually, at the time the issue was analysed, [containerd had dead code that implemented this feature](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/v2.2.3/pkg/rootfs/init_linux.go) but the implementation contained several security issues that would arguably have made it more exploitable than in runc. Luckily, the code appears to have never been used (at l…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47