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      <title>GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g — Nodemailer Vulnerable to SMTP Command Injection via CRLF in Transport name Option (EHLO/HELO)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nodemailer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport `name` configuration option. The `name` value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (`\r\n`). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in `lib/smtp-connection/index.js`. When establishing an SMTP connection, the `name` option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// line 1336
this._sendCommand(&amp;#39;EHLO &amp;#39; + this.name);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_sendCommand` method writes the string directly to the socket followed by `\r\n` (line 1082):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + &amp;#39;\r\n&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;utf-8&amp;#39;));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the `name` option contains `\r\n` sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the `envelope.from` and `envelope.to` fields which are validated for `\r\n` (line 1107-1119), and unlike `envelope.size` which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the `name` parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nodemailer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport `name` configuration option. The `name` value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (`\r\n`). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in `lib/smtp-connection/index.js`. When establishing an SMTP connection, the `name` option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// line 1336
this._sendCommand(&amp;#39;EHLO &amp;#39; + this.name);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_sendCommand` method writes the string directly to the socket followed by `\r\n` (line 1082):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + &amp;#39;\r\n&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;utf-8&amp;#39;));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the `name` option contains `\r\n` sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the `envelope.from` and `envelope.to` fields which are validated for `\r\n` (line 1107-1119), and unlike `envelope.size` which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the `name` parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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