<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:44:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100709</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100709</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator&amp;#39;s password can bypass the administrator&amp;#39;s TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator&amp;#39;s password can bypass the administrator&amp;#39;s TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100709</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pj38-8h4x-w384</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pj38-8h4x-w384</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator&amp;#39;s password can bypass the administrator&amp;#39;s TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator&amp;#39;s password can bypass the administrator&amp;#39;s TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pj38-8h4x-w384</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
