https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 20:04:43 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107810 <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, internal/backup/restore.go extracts inner archives before applying the restore_nginx and restore_nginx_ui flags and permits symlinks targeting the live Nginx configuration path. An authenticated user who can create and restore backups can craft a valid backup that places a symlink in the staging tree and then writes a regular file through that link, even when both restore flags are false. This can persistently inject configuration or cause denial of service when the modified files are later consumed. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.</p> <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, internal/backup/restore.go extracts inner archives before applying the restore_nginx and restore_nginx_ui flags and permits symlinks targeting the live Nginx configuration path. An authenticated user who can create and restore backups can craft a valid backup that places a symlink in the staging tree and then writes a regular file through that link, even when both restore flags are false. This can persistently inject configuration or cause denial of service when the modified files are later consumed. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107810 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p8v3-89rh-jxc7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p> <p>### Summary An authenticated user who can create and restore a backup can craft a valid backup archive that causes the restore staging process to write attacker-controlled files into the live Nginx configuration path even when both `restore_nginx` and `restore_nginx_ui` are set to `false`.</p> <p>### Details The restore flow always extracts the outer archive, verifies the manifest, decrypts `nginx-ui.zip` and `nginx.zip`, and extracts both inner archives before it decides whether `RestoreNginx` or `RestoreNginxUI` should be applied. The zip extractor explicitly allows absolute symlinks when the link target is under `nginx.GetConfPath()` or `nginx.GetModulesPath()`. Later regular-file entries are then created with `os.OpenFile()` on the symlinked path, which follows the symlink and writes into the live path.</p> <p>Relevant code paths: - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:39) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:79) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:204) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:286) - [api/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/restore.go:31) - [api/backup/backup.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/backup.go:15)</p> <p>This means the restore trust boundary is broken during extraction. A restore request that explicitly…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p> <p>### Summary An authenticated user who can create and restore a backup can craft a valid backup archive that causes the restore staging process to write attacker-controlled files into the live Nginx configuration path even when both `restore_nginx` and `restore_nginx_ui` are set to `false`.</p> <p>### Details The restore flow always extracts the outer archive, verifies the manifest, decrypts `nginx-ui.zip` and `nginx.zip`, and extracts both inner archives before it decides whether `RestoreNginx` or `RestoreNginxUI` should be applied. The zip extractor explicitly allows absolute symlinks when the link target is under `nginx.GetConfPath()` or `nginx.GetModulesPath()`. Later regular-file entries are then created with `os.OpenFile()` on the symlinked path, which follows the symlink and writes into the live path.</p> <p>Relevant code paths: - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:39) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:79) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:204) - [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:286) - [api/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/restore.go:31) - [api/backup/backup.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/backup.go:15)</p> <p>This means the restore trust boundary is broken during extraction. A restore request that explicitly…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-p8v3-89rh-jxc7