https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 19:09:32 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-18416 <p>The CoAP link-format helper match_path_uri() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c compares a registered resource path against the URI carried in a Uri-Query href= option. That URI is not NUL terminated, but the inner character loop advanced its index k once per path character without ever testing it against the option length len. When a registered path segment is longer than the supplied URI and the URI is a prefix of it, the loop reads uri[len] and beyond, past the end of the option value.</p> <p>The path is reached from coap_well_known_core_get_len() and coap_well_known_core_get() via match_queries_resource(), i.e. by any unauthenticated GET /.well-known/core?href=/&lt;prefix&gt; request to a device that serves /.well-known/core (for the CoAP server subsystem, CONFIG_COAP_SERVER_WELL_KNOWN_CORE, default y) and has at least one resource that declares struct coap_core_metadata attributes.</p> <p>The over-read does not reach the receive buffer. The well-known-core builders parse the query into a stack-local struct coap_option, whose value is a fixed array (value[12], or CONFIG_COAP_EXTENDED_OPTIONS_LEN_VALUE bytes) that the option bytes are copied into, so uri points into that copy. Reading past len therefore reads the unused, uninitialized tail of the array and, when the option fills it, the bytes just past it in the same stack frame. (In the ZoAP library of v1.8.0 to v1.9.x the option value was instead a pointer into the received packet, and the over-read ran past the option inside the…</p> <p>The CoAP link-format helper match_path_uri() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c compares a registered resource path against the URI carried in a Uri-Query href= option. That URI is not NUL terminated, but the inner character loop advanced its index k once per path character without ever testing it against the option length len. When a registered path segment is longer than the supplied URI and the URI is a prefix of it, the loop reads uri[len] and beyond, past the end of the option value.</p> <p>The path is reached from coap_well_known_core_get_len() and coap_well_known_core_get() via match_queries_resource(), i.e. by any unauthenticated GET /.well-known/core?href=/&lt;prefix&gt; request to a device that serves /.well-known/core (for the CoAP server subsystem, CONFIG_COAP_SERVER_WELL_KNOWN_CORE, default y) and has at least one resource that declares struct coap_core_metadata attributes.</p> <p>The over-read does not reach the receive buffer. The well-known-core builders parse the query into a stack-local struct coap_option, whose value is a fixed array (value[12], or CONFIG_COAP_EXTENDED_OPTIONS_LEN_VALUE bytes) that the option bytes are copied into, so uri points into that copy. Reading past len therefore reads the unused, uninitialized tail of the array and, when the option fills it, the bytes just past it in the same stack frame. (In the ZoAP library of v1.8.0 to v1.9.x the option value was instead a pointer into the received packet, and the over-read ran past the option inside the…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-18416