https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:41:52 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49870 <p>Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.1, POST /two-factor has no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter, allowing an attacker with valid credentials to submit unlimited TOTP guesses against the three accepted codes created by config/google2fa.php window=1. A successful guess creates a fully authenticated session. When two_factor_enabled is 1, POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0 can disable two-factor authentication without OTP reverification, while required mode 2 prevents that opt-out. An administrator can also use POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset to clear another user&#39;s secret. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.1.</p> <p>Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.1, POST /two-factor has no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter, allowing an attacker with valid credentials to submit unlimited TOTP guesses against the three accepted codes created by config/google2fa.php window=1. A successful guess creates a fully authenticated session. When two_factor_enabled is 1, POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0 can disable two-factor authentication without OTP reverification, while required mode 2 prevents that opt-out. An administrator can also use POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset to clear another user&#39;s secret. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49870 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: snipe/snipe-it</p> <p>### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.</p> <p>After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled=&#39;1&#39;`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`=&#39;2&#39;`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user&#39;s 2FA secret.</p> <p>### Patches Patched in v8.6.0</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: snipe/snipe-it</p> <p>### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.</p> <p>After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled=&#39;1&#39;`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`=&#39;2&#39;`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user&#39;s 2FA secret.</p> <p>### Patches Patched in v8.6.0</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2