fkie_cve-2026-54746

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. From 0.40.0 until 0.91.1, the Dispatcher gRPC service does not verify that a request's worker ID belongs to the tenant identified by the bearer-token context in Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe. An authenticated owner of any tenant who guesses another tenant's worker UUID can overwrite that worker's affinity labels or disconnect the worker from the dispatcher. This can cause cross-tenant integrity impact and denial of service on multi-tenant Hatchet Cloud or shared self-hosted deployments. Single-tenant deployments are not practically affected because the attacker and target tenant are the same. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.

GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg — Hatchet allows cross-tenant write/DoS to other tenants' workers via Dispatcher gRPC UpsertWorkerLabels and Unsubscribe

Affected: Go: github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet

### Summary

A **cross-tenant write / DoS** vulnerability in the Hatchet `Dispatcher` gRPC service allows any holder of a normal tenant-scoped API token (the lowest credential Hatchet issues — an `OWNER` of a brand-new tenant) to overwrite the affinity labels of, or disconnect from the dispatcher, any worker UUID belonging to any other tenant on the same Hatchet instance. The two affected RPCs — `Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels` and `Dispatcher/Unsubscribe` — read the caller's tenant from the bearer-token context only for analytics and response shaping, and never use it to authorise the `worker_id` from the request body.

### Impact This CVE requires the attacker to successfully guess the target UUID. **Who is impacted.** Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance: - **Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)** — every tenant is exposed to every other tenant. - **Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance** — each team is exposed to every other team on the box. - **Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker** (e.g. a leaked low-privilege CI token from a single tenant). One token is enough to attack every other tenant on the same instance.

Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).

Most recent entries from all

fkie_cve-2026-54746

GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg — Hatchet allows cross-tenant write/DoS to other tenants' workers via Dispatcher gRPC UpsertWorkerLabels and Unsubscribe