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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55580</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55580</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, config.go initializes Security.Enabled to false, and when MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE is unset, main.go starts the documented bare-binary deployment without a security policy. SecurityValidator.validateCommand in security.go then short-circuits and allows every command supplied to the shell_exec MCP tool, so an LLM connected over stdio can execute unrestricted OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The README from-source installation and MCP client configuration omit MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE, making the insecure state the documented default. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, config.go initializes Security.Enabled to false, and when MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE is unset, main.go starts the documented bare-binary deployment without a security policy. SecurityValidator.validateCommand in security.go then short-circuits and allows every command supplied to the shell_exec MCP tool, so an LLM connected over stdio can execute unrestricted OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The README from-source installation and MCP client configuration omit MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE, making the insecure state the documented default. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55580</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m — mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f5pj-2738-996m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell` at commit `17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433` has two issues that together mean neither the default deploy path nor the recommended &amp;#34;secure mode&amp;#34; delivers the restriction they&amp;#39;re marketed as providing. Filing these together because the two failure modes bracket the full intended audience — the from-source path gets users who skip security config entirely, the Docker path gets users who follow the security.yaml example and believe they&amp;#39;re protected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first issue is in `config.go`, line 49:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
config := &amp;amp;Config{
    Security: SecurityConfig{
        Enabled: false,
    },
    ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security is opt-in. The bare binary ships with `Enabled: false`, and `security.go` lines 26–29 make the consequence explicit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (v *SecurityValidator) validateCommand(command string) error {
    if !v.config.Enabled {
        v.logger.Debug().Str(&amp;#34;command&amp;#34;, command).Msg(&amp;#34;Security disabled, allowing command&amp;#34;)
        return nil
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`main.go` lines 35–39 confirm the deployment condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
configFile := os.Getenv(&amp;#34;MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE&amp;#34;)
if configFile != &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
    log.Info().Str(&amp;#34;config_file&amp;#34;, configFile).Msg(&amp;#34;Loading security config&amp;#34;)
} else {
    log.Info().Msg(&amp;#34;No security config file specified, security disabled&amp;#34;)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The README&amp;#39;s from-source install path (lines 22–26) runs `git clone ... &amp;amp;&amp;amp; make install &amp;amp;&amp;amp; mcp-shell` with no environment variable and no config file. The MCP client config example block (lines 78–85) passes only `MCP_SH…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell` at commit `17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433` has two issues that together mean neither the default deploy path nor the recommended &amp;#34;secure mode&amp;#34; delivers the restriction they&amp;#39;re marketed as providing. Filing these together because the two failure modes bracket the full intended audience — the from-source path gets users who skip security config entirely, the Docker path gets users who follow the security.yaml example and believe they&amp;#39;re protected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first issue is in `config.go`, line 49:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
config := &amp;amp;Config{
    Security: SecurityConfig{
        Enabled: false,
    },
    ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security is opt-in. The bare binary ships with `Enabled: false`, and `security.go` lines 26–29 make the consequence explicit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (v *SecurityValidator) validateCommand(command string) error {
    if !v.config.Enabled {
        v.logger.Debug().Str(&amp;#34;command&amp;#34;, command).Msg(&amp;#34;Security disabled, allowing command&amp;#34;)
        return nil
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`main.go` lines 35–39 confirm the deployment condition:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
configFile := os.Getenv(&amp;#34;MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE&amp;#34;)
if configFile != &amp;#34;&amp;#34; {
    log.Info().Str(&amp;#34;config_file&amp;#34;, configFile).Msg(&amp;#34;Loading security config&amp;#34;)
} else {
    log.Info().Msg(&amp;#34;No security config file specified, security disabled&amp;#34;)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The README&amp;#39;s from-source install path (lines 22–26) runs `git clone ... &amp;amp;&amp;amp; make install &amp;amp;&amp;amp; mcp-shell` with no environment variable and no config file. The MCP client config example block (lines 78–85) passes only `MCP_SH…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f5pj-2738-996m</guid>
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