https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:44:32 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55696 <p>PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, AttachmentViewer.setAttachment in js/privatebin.js uses getAttachmentMimeType to accept attacker-controlled MIME types and uses getBlobUrl to create a same-origin blob before setting attachmentLink&#39;s href for the Download attachment link. The SVG-only sanitization branch updates only the preview blob, so text/html, image/svg, application/xhtml+xml, and text/xml attachments can remain active in the download blob. On an instance with fileupload = true and a weakened, stripped, or absent Content Security Policy, an anonymous attacker can create such an attachment, and a victim who opens the link in a new tab causes inline JavaScript to execute in the PrivateBin origin. The script can read origin-scoped local storage and issue same-origin requests, including requests to applications co-hosted on the same domain. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5.</p> <p>PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, AttachmentViewer.setAttachment in js/privatebin.js uses getAttachmentMimeType to accept attacker-controlled MIME types and uses getBlobUrl to create a same-origin blob before setting attachmentLink&#39;s href for the Download attachment link. The SVG-only sanitization branch updates only the preview blob, so text/html, image/svg, application/xhtml+xml, and text/xml attachments can remain active in the download blob. On an instance with fileupload = true and a weakened, stripped, or absent Content Security Policy, an anonymous attacker can create such an attachment, and a victim who opens the link in a new tab causes inline JavaScript to execute in the PrivateBin origin. The script can read origin-scoped local storage and issue same-origin requests, including requests to applications co-hosted on the same domain. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55696 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f2xf-7x3g-4272 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: privatebin/privatebin</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in PrivateBin&#39;s attachment download link. An anonymous attacker can create a paste with a **text/html** attachment that, with certain user interaction, bypasses protections similar to CVE-2022-24833. When a victim opens the &#34;Download attachment&#34; link in a new tab, the attacker&#39;s inline JavaScript executes in the PrivateBin instance&#39;s origin with full same-origin capability (cookie/localStorage access, same-origin fetch).</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [CVE-2022-24833](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/security/advisories/GHSA-cqcc-mm6x-vmvw). The original fix only applies to the inline preview blob (in case of SVG), never to the download link&#39;s blob. Thus a **text/html** (or **image/svg**) attachment completely bypasses sanitization, re-enabling the exact attack class on instances that don&#39;t enforce the recommended Content-Security-Policy, but with a slightly different attack process.</p> <p>Instances using the default recommended CSP are protected (the blob inherits **script-src &#39;self&#39;**, blocking inline scripts). The vulnerability affects instances where CSP is weakened, stripped, or absent, which is exactly the defense-in-depth scenario the CVE-2022-24833 fix was meant to cover.</p> <p>Requires **fileupload = true** (non-default) and a non-recommended CSP configuration.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In **js/privatebin.js**, the function **AttachmentViewer.setAttachment** (line 2982) processes decrypted attachment data. Since PrivateBin uses zero-k…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: privatebin/privatebin</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in PrivateBin&#39;s attachment download link. An anonymous attacker can create a paste with a **text/html** attachment that, with certain user interaction, bypasses protections similar to CVE-2022-24833. When a victim opens the &#34;Download attachment&#34; link in a new tab, the attacker&#39;s inline JavaScript executes in the PrivateBin instance&#39;s origin with full same-origin capability (cookie/localStorage access, same-origin fetch).</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [CVE-2022-24833](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/security/advisories/GHSA-cqcc-mm6x-vmvw). The original fix only applies to the inline preview blob (in case of SVG), never to the download link&#39;s blob. Thus a **text/html** (or **image/svg**) attachment completely bypasses sanitization, re-enabling the exact attack class on instances that don&#39;t enforce the recommended Content-Security-Policy, but with a slightly different attack process.</p> <p>Instances using the default recommended CSP are protected (the blob inherits **script-src &#39;self&#39;**, blocking inline scripts). The vulnerability affects instances where CSP is weakened, stripped, or absent, which is exactly the defense-in-depth scenario the CVE-2022-24833 fix was meant to cover.</p> <p>Requires **fileupload = true** (non-default) and a non-recommended CSP configuration.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In **js/privatebin.js**, the function **AttachmentViewer.setAttachment** (line 2982) processes decrypted attachment data. Since PrivateBin uses zero-k…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f2xf-7x3g-4272