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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-6827</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6827</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;justhtml before 1.17.0 contains multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling. When custom policies preserve foreign namespaces (SVG/MathML), dangerous content such as HTML integration points (SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt;, MathML &amp;lt;annotation-xml encoding=&amp;#34;text/html&amp;#34;&amp;gt;) and mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads could survive sanitization and become active HTML after reparse; SVG filter=&amp;#34;url(...)&amp;#34; and preserved &amp;lt;style&amp;gt; could leave resource-loading CSS (@import, background-image:url()). Programmatic script/style/Comment nodes could serialize into active markup. Additional hardening fixes address sanitize-pipeline cache mutation and DOM parent/child cycles that could cause infinite loops. Most issues affect advanced or custom configurations rather than the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) safe path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;justhtml before 1.17.0 contains multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling. When custom policies preserve foreign namespaces (SVG/MathML), dangerous content such as HTML integration points (SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt;, MathML &amp;lt;annotation-xml encoding=&amp;#34;text/html&amp;#34;&amp;gt;) and mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads could survive sanitization and become active HTML after reparse; SVG filter=&amp;#34;url(...)&amp;#34; and preserved &amp;lt;style&amp;gt; could leave resource-loading CSS (@import, background-image:url()). Programmatic script/style/Comment nodes could serialize into active markup. Additional hardening fixes address sanitize-pipeline cache mutation and DOM parent/child cycles that could cause infinite loops. Most issues affect advanced or custom configurations rather than the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) safe path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-f8m6-5gph-fw7f</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f8m6-5gph-fw7f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;justhtml before 1.17.0 contains multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling. When custom policies preserve foreign namespaces (SVG/MathML), dangerous content such as HTML integration points (SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt;, MathML &amp;lt;annotation-xml encoding=&amp;#34;text/html&amp;#34;&amp;gt;) and mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads could survive sanitization and become active HTML after reparse; SVG filter=&amp;#34;url(...)&amp;#34; and preserved &amp;lt;style&amp;gt; could leave resource-loading CSS (@import, background-image:url()). Programmatic script/style/Comment nodes could serialize into active markup. Additional hardening fixes address sanitize-pipeline cache mutation and DOM parent/child cycles that could cause infinite loops. Most issues affect advanced or custom configurations rather than the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) safe path.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;justhtml before 1.17.0 contains multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling. When custom policies preserve foreign namespaces (SVG/MathML), dangerous content such as HTML integration points (SVG &amp;lt;foreignObject&amp;gt;, MathML &amp;lt;annotation-xml encoding=&amp;#34;text/html&amp;#34;&amp;gt;) and mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads could survive sanitization and become active HTML after reparse; SVG filter=&amp;#34;url(...)&amp;#34; and preserved &amp;lt;style&amp;gt; could leave resource-loading CSS (@import, background-image:url()). Programmatic script/style/Comment nodes could serialize into active markup. Additional hardening fixes address sanitize-pipeline cache mutation and DOM parent/child cycles that could cause infinite loops. Most issues affect advanced or custom configurations rather than the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) safe path.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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