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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-71494</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71494</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Infracost provides cloud cost intelligence for engineers, AI coding agents, and CI/CD. Prior to 0.10.45, internal/hcl/remote_variables_loader.go and related Terraform Cloud, remote-plan, and Terragrunt registry request paths can attach a configured Terraform Cloud or registry token to a destination hostname derived from untrusted Terraform input without confirming that it is the configured trusted host. When a CI run provides a token while scanning attacker-controlled Terraform, including pull_request_target or a same-repository pull request, an attacker can direct the request to an attacker-controlled host and disclose the token. Standard fork pull_request workflows without secrets are not exposed. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.45.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Infracost provides cloud cost intelligence for engineers, AI coding agents, and CI/CD. Prior to 0.10.45, internal/hcl/remote_variables_loader.go and related Terraform Cloud, remote-plan, and Terragrunt registry request paths can attach a configured Terraform Cloud or registry token to a destination hostname derived from untrusted Terraform input without confirming that it is the configured trusted host. When a CI run provides a token while scanning attacker-controlled Terraform, including pull_request_target or a same-repository pull request, an attacker can direct the request to an attacker-controlled host and disclose the token. Standard fork pull_request workflows without secrets are not exposed. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.45.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71494</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-6x6c-w9w9-hv4h — Infracost: Terraform Cloud and registry token disclosure via unvalidated hostname</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6x6c-w9w9-hv4h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/infracost/infracost&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under `on: pull_request` (the only configuration in Infracost&amp;#39;s documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under `pull_request_target`, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `v0.10.45` ([#3590](https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3590)) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and skips remote variable loading
  - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the `latest` Docker tag: upgrade to `v0.10.45` (or later) to receive the fix.
  - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to `v0.10.45`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No full fix without upgrading. To limit exp…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/infracost/infracost&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under `on: pull_request` (the only configuration in Infracost&amp;#39;s documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under `pull_request_target`, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in `v0.10.45` ([#3590](https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3590)) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and skips remote variable loading
  - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the `latest` Docker tag: upgrade to `v0.10.45` (or later) to receive the fix.
  - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to `v0.10.45`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No full fix without upgrading. To limit exp…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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