https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:16:14 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72121 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72121 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069 certfr-2026-avi-1069 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72121 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values</p> <p>KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.</p> <p>Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.</p> <p>hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.</p> <p>Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.</p> <p>bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snap…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values</p> <p>KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.</p> <p>Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.</p> <p>hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.</p> <p>Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.</p> <p>bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snap…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72121 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-85wx-h4w2-c465 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values</p> <p>KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.</p> <p>Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.</p> <p>hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.</p> <p>Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.</p> <p>bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snap…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values</p> <p>KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.</p> <p>Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.</p> <p>hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.</p> <p>Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.</p> <p>bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snap…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-85wx-h4w2-c465 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72121 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic. Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock. hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller. Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent. bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snapshot o…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler() run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic. Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter (nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock. hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller. Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the stored reply frame&#39;s can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged buffer for updates, directly on op-&gt;frames pre-registration for new ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent. bcm_rx_handler()&#39;s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected snapshot o…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72121 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852