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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 15:22:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72124</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72124</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72124</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1069 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1069</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72124</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72124</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts:
sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming
Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled
transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with
hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows
where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already
moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg()
takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to
ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s
timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf()
already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now
takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim.
This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s
cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is
concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel
timers and reset the state unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg()
sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run
under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves
woul…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts:
sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming
Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled
transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with
hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows
where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already
moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg()
takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to
ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s
timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf()
already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now
takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim.
This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s
cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is
concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel
timers and reset the state unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg()
sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run
under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves
woul…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72124</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h95p-28wv-6wpp</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h95p-28wv-6wpp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts:
sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming
Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled
transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with
hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows
where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already
moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg()
takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to
ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s
timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf()
already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now
takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim.
This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s
cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is
concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel
timers and reset the state unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg()
sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run
under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves
woul…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts:
sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming
Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled
transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with
hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows
where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already
moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg()
takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to
ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s
timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf()
already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now
takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim.
This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s
cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is
concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel
timers and reset the state unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg()
sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run
under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves
woul…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h95p-28wv-6wpp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72124</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72124</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts: sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer. so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg() takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf() already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim. This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel timers and reset the state unconditionally. isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg() sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending. Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves would dea…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock The TX state machine (so-&amp;gt;tx.state) is driven from three contexts: sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock elsewhere left windows where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer. so-&amp;gt;rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg() takes it to check so-&amp;gt;tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to ISOTP_SENDING, bump so-&amp;gt;tx_gen and drain the previous transfer&amp;#39;s timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf() already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim. This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()&amp;#39;s cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel timers and reset the state unconditionally. isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg() sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending. Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so-&amp;gt;rx_lock, since they run under so-&amp;gt;rx_lock&amp;#39;s cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves would dea…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72124</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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