https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:49:34 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72183 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72183 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069 certfr-2026-avi-1069 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72183 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</p> <p>LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.</p> <p>A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.</p> <p>The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked.</p> <p>Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</p> <p>LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.</p> <p>A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.</p> <p>The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked.</p> <p>Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72183 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5hcp-6cc5-jgx7 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</p> <p>LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.</p> <p>A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.</p> <p>The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked.</p> <p>Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</p> <p>LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.</p> <p>A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.</p> <p>The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked.</p> <p>Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5hcp-6cc5-jgx7 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72183 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path. A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it. The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked. Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is enfo…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path. A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group&#39;s task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it. The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller&#39;s thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller&#39;s thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked. Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is enfo…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72183 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852