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CLEANSTART-2026-TU13335 — RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0

Affected: CleanStart: opentelemetry-collector-contrib

Security vulnerability affects the opentelemetry-collector-contrib package. RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.

fkie_cve-2026-77404

RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, URI.String in uri.go concatenates CertFile, KeyFile, CACertFile, and ServerName values directly into an AMQPS query string instead of encoding them as URL query parameters with url.Values. If an application accepts a TLS asset path containing ampersand or equals delimiters and later reparses the serialized URI with ParseURI, the embedded delimiters can create or overwrite connection options, including paths to TLS certificate, key, or CA files. This can corrupt connection configuration or select unintended local cryptographic assets. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.

GHSA-465g-fh3v-9jw4 — RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Connection Configuration Overwrite via Unsanitized TLS Path Parameter Injection

Affected: Go: github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go

## Summary A query parameter injection vulnerability exists in the AMQP client's connection URI formatting logic. When generating or parsing connection URIs, TLS-related filesystem paths (such as certificates or keys) are appended directly to the URI's query string using string concatenation rather than secure URL encoding via functions like `url.QueryEscape`.

If an application handles a TLS file path containing special character delimiters (such as `&` or `=`), these characters are interpreted as parameter separators by the URI parser. If the resulting `URI.String()` output is subsequently re-parsed via `ParseURI`, the injected fields can silently overwrite or hijack critical configuration parameters, forcing the client to use arbitrary connection settings or alternate TLS files.

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## Vulnerability Details

### Mechanism The vulnerability lies within the lack of proper escaping when compiling connection string components into a raw URL format:

```go // Example of insecure string concatenation during URI building uri := fmt.Sprintf("amqps://user:pass@host/%s?certfile=%s&keyfile=%s", vhost, certPath, keyPath) ```

Because `certPath` and `keyPath` are not passed through `url.QueryEscape`, special URL characters preserve their control meanings. For instance, if a user supply a certificate path named: `/tmp/cert=foo&keyfile=/evil/path`

The generated string translates into: `...?certfile=/tmp/cert=foo&keyfile=/evil/path&keyfile=/original/path`

When this string passes back…

RHSA-2026:68290 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update

github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via AMQP frame size negotiation github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Connection configuration overwrite via unsanitized TLS path parameter injection github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via signed-to-unsigned integer casting github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Plaintext Credential Exposure via Exported PLAIN Authentication Fields github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service due to synchronous event channel blocking github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via unbounded body buffer allocation github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go: RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Denial of Service via Malicious AMQP Field Length go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/log: OpenTelemetry-Go: Denial of Service via attacker-driven log emission