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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 05:05:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90138</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90138</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90138</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90138</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90138</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps:
	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT})
	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect)
	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0
	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0
	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after
binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back
to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it
to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The
unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This
listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never
inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a
normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this
incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the
EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to
never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport
implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a non-blocking connect(), vso…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps:
	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT})
	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect)
	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0
	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0
	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after
binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back
to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it
to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The
unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This
listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never
inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a
normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this
incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the
EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to
never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport
implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a non-blocking connect(), vso…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90138</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r47p-87c6-4p5v</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r47p-87c6-4p5v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps:
	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT})
	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect)
	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0
	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0
	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after
binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back
to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it
to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The
unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This
listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never
inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a
normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this
incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the
EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to
never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport
implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a non-blocking connect(), vso…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps:
	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT})
	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect)
	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0
	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0
	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after
binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back
to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it
to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The
unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This
listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never
inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a
normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this
incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the
EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to
never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport
implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For a non-blocking connect(), vso…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r47p-87c6-4p5v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90138</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90138</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept() Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps: 	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) 	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT}) 	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect) 	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0 	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) 	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0 	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err) Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO. After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect. This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket. For a non-blocking connect(), vsock_con…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: don&amp;#39;t check the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err in vsock_accept() Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps: 	r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) 	bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT}) 	connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (self-connect) 	listen(r0, backlog)                   -&amp;gt; 0 	r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) 	connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -&amp;gt; 0 	accept(r0)                            -&amp;gt; -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err) Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO. After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This listen() call succeeds because the kernel&amp;#39;s listening path never inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this incoming connection because the listener&amp;#39;s sk_err still holds the EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect. This rejection causes the child socket created for r1&amp;#39;s connection to never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket. For a non-blocking connect(), vsock_con…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90138</guid>
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