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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:27:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90413</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90413</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-90413</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength);
	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from
iscsi_target_do_login().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so
an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,
before authentication and with the length under its control:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
  Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
   iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350
  Allocated by task 167:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
  allocated 8192-byte region&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the
same buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength);
	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from
iscsi_target_do_login().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so
an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,
before authentication and with the length under its control:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
  Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
   iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350
  Allocated by task 167:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
  allocated 8192-byte region&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the
same buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90413</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3r7q-5rxg-29mw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3r7q-5rxg-29mw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength);
	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from
iscsi_target_do_login().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so
an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,
before authentication and with the length under its control:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
  Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
   iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350
  Allocated by task 167:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
  allocated 8192-byte region&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the
same buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength);
	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from
iscsi_target_do_login().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so
an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it,
before authentication and with the length under its control:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
  Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80
   iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350
  Allocated by task 167:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
   iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
  allocated 8192-byte region&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the
same buffer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3r7q-5rxg-29mw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-90413 — IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90413</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-90413</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-90413</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4185 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst-&amp;amp;gt;ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dumped set itself stays pinned via set-&amp;amp;gt;ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4185</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90413</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), 	payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength); 	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80   Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167    __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60    kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80    iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180    iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350   Allocated by task 167:    __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370    iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192   allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU&amp;#39;s BHS declares.  isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login-&amp;gt;req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), 	payload_length = ntoh24(login_req-&amp;gt;dlength); 	tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login-&amp;gt;req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login-&amp;gt;req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80   Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167    __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60    kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80    iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180    iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350   Allocated by task 167:    __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370    iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192   allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90413</guid>
    </item>
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