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      <title>CVE-2026-103435 — Arbitrary File Write via Write-Time Symlink Following (TOCTOU) in Claude Code</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-103435</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Anthropic @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Anthropic @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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