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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-107336 — Authentication Bypass by Spoofing in Malcolm</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-107336</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CISA Malcolm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CISA Malcolm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s front nginx reverse proxy defines a &amp;#34;Dashboards → Arkime shortcut&amp;#34; location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location&amp;#39;s proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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