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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 02:04:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-11743 — Missing negative-offset/overflow check in SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver allows out-of-bounds read and write</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-11743</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; zephyrproject zephyr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver (drivers/flash/flash_sf32lb_mpi_qspi_nor.c) validated the flash offset and length on its read and write paths with the test (offset + size) &amp;gt; data-&amp;gt;size. Because offset is a signed off_t while size is unsigned, a negative offset is converted to a large unsigned value and the addition can wrap to a small result that passes the check. The read path then performs memcpy(dst, (void *)(data-&amp;gt;base + offset), size) and the write path programs flash at offset and cache-invalidates data-&amp;gt;base + offset, in both cases accessing memory outside the mapped flash window. The driver&amp;#39;s erase path already rejected negative offsets, but read and write did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, flash_read and flash_write are syscalls whose verifiers validate the device object and the caller&amp;#39;s buffer but deliberately delegate offset bounds checking to the driver. An unprivileged thread that has been granted access to this flash device can therefore call the syscall with a crafted negative offset and a buffer valid in its own memory domain, and reach the unchecked access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most direct impact is on the read path: by choosing a negative offset and matching size, an attacker slides the memcpy source below the flash base and copies arbitrary CPU-addressable memory into its own buffer, disclosing memory it is not authorized to read. The write path additionally allows programming flash at an out-of-range address and invalidating an attacker-chosen cache range, a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; zephyrproject zephyr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver (drivers/flash/flash_sf32lb_mpi_qspi_nor.c) validated the flash offset and length on its read and write paths with the test (offset + size) &amp;gt; data-&amp;gt;size. Because offset is a signed off_t while size is unsigned, a negative offset is converted to a large unsigned value and the addition can wrap to a small result that passes the check. The read path then performs memcpy(dst, (void *)(data-&amp;gt;base + offset), size) and the write path programs flash at offset and cache-invalidates data-&amp;gt;base + offset, in both cases accessing memory outside the mapped flash window. The driver&amp;#39;s erase path already rejected negative offsets, but read and write did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, flash_read and flash_write are syscalls whose verifiers validate the device object and the caller&amp;#39;s buffer but deliberately delegate offset bounds checking to the driver. An unprivileged thread that has been granted access to this flash device can therefore call the syscall with a crafted negative offset and a buffer valid in its own memory domain, and reach the unchecked access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most direct impact is on the read path: by choosing a negative offset and matching size, an attacker slides the memcpy source below the flash base and copies arbitrary CPU-addressable memory into its own buffer, disclosing memory it is not authorized to read. The write path additionally allows programming flash at an out-of-range address and invalidating an attacker-chosen cache range, a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-11743</guid>
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