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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:07:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-18092 — Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_x…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-18092</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; TIMLEGGE Net::SAML2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature&amp;#39;s Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker&amp;#39;s NameID and attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; TIMLEGGE Net::SAML2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature&amp;#39;s Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker&amp;#39;s NameID and attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-18092</guid>
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