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      <title>CVE-2026-41262 — Fleet: Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41262</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fleetdm fleet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet&amp;#39;s team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams&amp;#39; policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fleetdm fleet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet&amp;#39;s team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams&amp;#39; policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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