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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 08:37:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-45103 — OpenSIPS: SIP Message Smuggling via TCP Content-Length Integer Overflow</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45103</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opensips&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection&amp;#39;s authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; opensips&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection&amp;#39;s authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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