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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-47233 — Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47233</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Version 5.0.9 added a missing `isAdministratorInventory()` gate to `case &amp;#39;item_delete&amp;#39;:` in `modules/inventory.php`. The same fix was not applied to the sibling `case &amp;#39;field_delete&amp;#39;:` handler, which destroys an entire inventory field definition, cascading to every `adm_inventory_item_data` row that referenced that field and every `adm_inventory_field_options` entry. The handler validates only a session-bound CSRF token; there is no `isAdministratorInventory()` check at the controller level, and `Admidio\Inventory\Entity\ItemField::delete()` does not enforce one at the entity level either (unlike its sibling `ItemField::save()`, which does check `$gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdministrator()`). Any user who can log in to the site can permanently destroy a non-system inventory field by sending one POST. Version 5.0.10 provides an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Version 5.0.9 added a missing `isAdministratorInventory()` gate to `case &amp;#39;item_delete&amp;#39;:` in `modules/inventory.php`. The same fix was not applied to the sibling `case &amp;#39;field_delete&amp;#39;:` handler, which destroys an entire inventory field definition, cascading to every `adm_inventory_item_data` row that referenced that field and every `adm_inventory_field_options` entry. The handler validates only a session-bound CSRF token; there is no `isAdministratorInventory()` check at the controller level, and `Admidio\Inventory\Entity\ItemField::delete()` does not enforce one at the entity level either (unlike its sibling `ItemField::save()`, which does check `$gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdministrator()`). Any user who can log in to the site can permanently destroy a non-system inventory field by sending one POST. Version 5.0.10 provides an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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