<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:42:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-48170 — scimPatch vulnerable to prototype pollution via unfiltered keys in patch</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48170</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; thomaspoignant scim-patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`scim-patch`, a library to perform SCIM patch, prior to version 0.9.1 performs prototype pollution when applying a SCIM PATCH operation whose `value` object contains a key like `&amp;#34;__proto__.someProp&amp;#34;`. After one such patch,
`Object.prototype.someProp` is set process-wide, affecting every plain object in the Node process. Any service that calls `scimPatch()` on attacker-controlled JSON (i.e. any SCIM endpoint accepting `PATCH` from an external IdP) is exploitable on a stock Node runtime. Version 0.9.1 contains a patch. A workaround is available. Calling `Object.freeze(Object.prototype)` (and the same on `Array.prototype`, `Function.prototype`) at process startup neutralizes this class of bug — assignment to a frozen prototype becomes a silent no-op in sloppy mode or a `TypeError` in strict mode. Node&amp;#39;s `--frozen-intrinsics` flag does this for built-ins automatically.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; thomaspoignant scim-patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`scim-patch`, a library to perform SCIM patch, prior to version 0.9.1 performs prototype pollution when applying a SCIM PATCH operation whose `value` object contains a key like `&amp;#34;__proto__.someProp&amp;#34;`. After one such patch,
`Object.prototype.someProp` is set process-wide, affecting every plain object in the Node process. Any service that calls `scimPatch()` on attacker-controlled JSON (i.e. any SCIM endpoint accepting `PATCH` from an external IdP) is exploitable on a stock Node runtime. Version 0.9.1 contains a patch. A workaround is available. Calling `Object.freeze(Object.prototype)` (and the same on `Array.prototype`, `Function.prototype`) at process startup neutralizes this class of bug — assignment to a frozen prototype becomes a silent no-op in sloppy mode or a `TypeError` in strict mode. Node&amp;#39;s `--frozen-intrinsics` flag does this for built-ins automatically.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48170</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
