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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:29:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-54542 — Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54542</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nimiq core-rs-albatross&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim&amp;#39;s sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nimiq core-rs-albatross&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim&amp;#39;s sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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