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      <title>CVE-2026-55580 — mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55580</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sonirico mcp-shell&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, config.go initializes Security.Enabled to false, and when MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE is unset, main.go starts the documented bare-binary deployment without a security policy. SecurityValidator.validateCommand in security.go then short-circuits and allows every command supplied to the shell_exec MCP tool, so an LLM connected over stdio can execute unrestricted OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The README from-source installation and MCP client configuration omit MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE, making the insecure state the documented default. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; sonirico mcp-shell&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, config.go initializes Security.Enabled to false, and when MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE is unset, main.go starts the documented bare-binary deployment without a security policy. SecurityValidator.validateCommand in security.go then short-circuits and allows every command supplied to the shell_exec MCP tool, so an LLM connected over stdio can execute unrestricted OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The README from-source installation and MCP client configuration omit MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE, making the insecure state the documented default. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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