https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:58:28 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55585 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> QWED-AI qwed-verification</p> <p>QWED is open-source AI verification infrastructure for deterministic verification of LLM outputs, tool calls, code, schemas, and agent state before production execution. Prior to 5.1.2, the qwed package passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict and local_dict namespaces, allowing Python eval() to resolve builtins and execute arbitrary Python code in the API server process. In src/qwed_new/api/main.py, POST /verify/math is protected by get_current_tenant but accepts any valid tenant API key, reads the expression field, applies only a cosmetic re.sub(r&#39;(\d)(()&#39;, r&#39;\1*\2&#39;, expression) normalization, and passes the result to parse_expr(). In src/qwed_new/core/batch.py, POST /verify/batch sends math items through batch_service.create_job(), stores item.query verbatim, and _verify_item() passes VerificationType.MATH input to parse_expr() without sanitization. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup endpoint allows anyone to create a standard tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and either vulnerable path can then be used to read or write files, modify data, execute operating system commands, terminate the service, and compromise other tenants in a shared deployment. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> QWED-AI qwed-verification</p> <p>QWED is open-source AI verification infrastructure for deterministic verification of LLM outputs, tool calls, code, schemas, and agent state before production execution. Prior to 5.1.2, the qwed package passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict and local_dict namespaces, allowing Python eval() to resolve builtins and execute arbitrary Python code in the API server process. In src/qwed_new/api/main.py, POST /verify/math is protected by get_current_tenant but accepts any valid tenant API key, reads the expression field, applies only a cosmetic re.sub(r&#39;(\d)(()&#39;, r&#39;\1*\2&#39;, expression) normalization, and passes the result to parse_expr(). In src/qwed_new/core/batch.py, POST /verify/batch sends math items through batch_service.create_job(), stores item.query verbatim, and _verify_item() passes VerificationType.MATH input to parse_expr() without sanitization. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup endpoint allows anyone to create a standard tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and either vulnerable path can then be used to read or write files, modify data, execute operating system commands, terminate the service, and compromise other tenants in a shared deployment. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55585