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      <title>CVE-2026-55696 — PrivateBin: Stored Cross-Side-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in attachment download link via dangerous MIME types with r…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55696</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PrivateBin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, AttachmentViewer.setAttachment in js/privatebin.js uses getAttachmentMimeType to accept attacker-controlled MIME types and uses getBlobUrl to create a same-origin blob before setting attachmentLink&amp;#39;s href for the Download attachment link. The SVG-only sanitization branch updates only the preview blob, so text/html, image/svg, application/xhtml+xml, and text/xml attachments can remain active in the download blob. On an instance with fileupload = true and a weakened, stripped, or absent Content Security Policy, an anonymous attacker can create such an attachment, and a victim who opens the link in a new tab causes inline JavaScript to execute in the PrivateBin origin. The script can read origin-scoped local storage and issue same-origin requests, including requests to applications co-hosted on the same domain. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PrivateBin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, AttachmentViewer.setAttachment in js/privatebin.js uses getAttachmentMimeType to accept attacker-controlled MIME types and uses getBlobUrl to create a same-origin blob before setting attachmentLink&amp;#39;s href for the Download attachment link. The SVG-only sanitization branch updates only the preview blob, so text/html, image/svg, application/xhtml+xml, and text/xml attachments can remain active in the download blob. On an instance with fileupload = true and a weakened, stripped, or absent Content Security Policy, an anonymous attacker can create such an attachment, and a victim who opens the link in a new tab causes inline JavaScript to execute in the PrivateBin origin. The script can read origin-scoped local storage and issue same-origin requests, including requests to applications co-hosted on the same domain. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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