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      <title>CVE-2026-57586 — CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-57586</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; naranor agent-coderag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable&amp;#39;s content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim&amp;#39;s operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; naranor agent-coderag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable&amp;#39;s content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim&amp;#39;s operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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