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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-5856 — Contiki-NG DNS/mDNS Resolver Out-of-Bounds Read via Unchecked skip_name Traversal Before Transaction-ID Validation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-5856</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Contiki-NG&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s DNS/mDNS resolver skip_name() in os/services/resolv/resolv.c walks DNS wire-format name labels with no packet-boundary check, and the caller in newdata() invokes it in a loop iterating nquestions times from the attacker-controlled DNS header before validating the transaction ID. An attacker who sets nquestions higher than the number of complete questions present causes skip_name() to walk past the UDP packet buffer, and the returned pointer is cast to struct dns_answer * for further memory reads. On builds with RESOLV_CONF_SUPPORTS_MDNS enabled, any peer on the local segment can trigger the read unauthenticated via a multicast UDP 5353 packet with no outstanding query required; on standard DNS builds an attacker who can inject a UDP response from port 53 during an outstanding query can trigger the same read. Impact is out-of-bounds read of uip_buf and adjacent memory, disclosing memory contents or crashing the resolver.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Contiki-NG&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s DNS/mDNS resolver skip_name() in os/services/resolv/resolv.c walks DNS wire-format name labels with no packet-boundary check, and the caller in newdata() invokes it in a loop iterating nquestions times from the attacker-controlled DNS header before validating the transaction ID. An attacker who sets nquestions higher than the number of complete questions present causes skip_name() to walk past the UDP packet buffer, and the returned pointer is cast to struct dns_answer * for further memory reads. On builds with RESOLV_CONF_SUPPORTS_MDNS enabled, any peer on the local segment can trigger the read unauthenticated via a multicast UDP 5353 packet with no outstanding query required; on standard DNS builds an attacker who can inject a UDP response from port 53 during an outstanding query can trigger the same read. Impact is out-of-bounds read of uip_buf and adjacent memory, disclosing memory contents or crashing the resolver.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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