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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:15:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64571 — wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64571</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a
device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds
that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 (&amp;#34;wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in
p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&amp;#34;) closed the destination overflow by copying a
fixed priv-&amp;gt;eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len),
but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long
enough to supply that many bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches
priv-&amp;gt;eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check
passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
  Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;IRQ&amp;gt;
   ...
   __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
   p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
   p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163)
   __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
   dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005)
   ...
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0
   which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
  The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of
   allocated…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a
device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds
that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 (&amp;#34;wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in
p54_rx_eeprom_readback()&amp;#34;) closed the destination overflow by copying a
fixed priv-&amp;gt;eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len),
but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long
enough to supply that many bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches
priv-&amp;gt;eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check
passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
  Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0
  Call Trace:
   &amp;lt;IRQ&amp;gt;
   ...
   __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
   p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507)
   p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163)
   __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
   dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005)
   ...
   &amp;lt;/IRQ&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0
   which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
  The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of
   allocated…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64571</guid>
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