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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64857 — tirreno has Session Fixation in Login Authentication</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64857</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tirrenotechnologies tirreno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tirreno, a security framework, has a session fixation issue in versions prior to 0.10.0. During authentication, tirreno validates the user&amp;#39;s credentials and establishes the authenticated session, but it does not call `session_regenerate_id()` afterward. As a result, the session identifier is not rotated on login, it stays the same before and after authentication. An attacker able to fix a known session identifier in a victim&amp;#39;s browser (for example through a network man-in-the-middle position, or a separate cross-site scripting or subdomain cookie-injection issue) could then gain access to the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session. The issue is fixed in v0.10.0. The session identifier is now regenerated on successful authentication, and the previous session is destroyed. There is no configuration-level workaround.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tirrenotechnologies tirreno&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tirreno, a security framework, has a session fixation issue in versions prior to 0.10.0. During authentication, tirreno validates the user&amp;#39;s credentials and establishes the authenticated session, but it does not call `session_regenerate_id()` afterward. As a result, the session identifier is not rotated on login, it stays the same before and after authentication. An attacker able to fix a known session identifier in a victim&amp;#39;s browser (for example through a network man-in-the-middle position, or a separate cross-site scripting or subdomain cookie-injection issue) could then gain access to the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session. The issue is fixed in v0.10.0. The session identifier is now regenerated on successful authentication, and the previous session is destroyed. There is no configuration-level workaround.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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