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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-66838 — SQL injection via the :comment option in Postgrex.stream/4</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-66838</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-ecto postgrex&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (&amp;#39;SQL Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows SQL Injection via the :comment option of Postgrex.stream/4. An attacker who can influence that value can close the comment delimiter with */ and extend the streamed statement with their own clauses, which execute under the connection&amp;#39;s role. Ecto exposes the same option through Ecto.Repo.stream/2.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Postgrex appends the comment by concatenating it into the statement text sent in the Parse message, without escaping or rejecting */. The option is validated by comment_not_present!/1 at every other execution point; stream/4 never calls it. Because Parse accepts a single command, the injection is confined to the streamed statement and further statements cannot be chained.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects postgrex: from 0.19.3 before 0.22.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-ecto postgrex&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (&amp;#39;SQL Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows SQL Injection via the :comment option of Postgrex.stream/4. An attacker who can influence that value can close the comment delimiter with */ and extend the streamed statement with their own clauses, which execute under the connection&amp;#39;s role. Ecto exposes the same option through Ecto.Repo.stream/2.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Postgrex appends the comment by concatenating it into the statement text sent in the Parse message, without escaping or rejecting */. The option is validated by comment_not_present!/1 at every other execution point; stream/4 never calls it. Because Parse accepts a single command, the injection is confined to the streamed statement and further statements cannot be chained.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects postgrex: from 0.19.3 before 0.22.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-66838</guid>
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