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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:44:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-67579 — Filter expression injection via forged keyset pagination cursor in Ash</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-67579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject a filter expression through a forged keyset pagination cursor, resulting in SQL injection or code execution depending on the data layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read actions with keyset pagination decode the client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex using non_executable_binary_to_term/2 with [:safe]. That guard blocks new atoms, funs, and ports, but not a struct built from atoms already interned in a running Ash application, so a decoded %Ash.Query.Call{} expression survives and is spliced into the keyset filter as a comparison value in do_filters/4 and evaluated. Because the cursor bypasses the Ash.Expr macro, the runtime never applies the private?/public? gate that would otherwise reject it. On AshPostgres the injected fragment is inlined into the SQL query; on the ETS and Simple data layers it is evaluated in-process as an arbitrary function call.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 1.17.0 before 3.31.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject a filter expression through a forged keyset pagination cursor, resulting in SQL injection or code execution depending on the data layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read actions with keyset pagination decode the client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex using non_executable_binary_to_term/2 with [:safe]. That guard blocks new atoms, funs, and ports, but not a struct built from atoms already interned in a running Ash application, so a decoded %Ash.Query.Call{} expression survives and is spliced into the keyset filter as a comparison value in do_filters/4 and evaluated. Because the cursor bypasses the Ash.Expr macro, the runtime never applies the private?/public? gate that would otherwise reject it. On AshPostgres the injected fragment is inlined into the SQL query; on the ETS and Simple data layers it is evaluated in-process as an arbitrary function call.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 1.17.0 before 3.31.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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