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      <title>CVE-2026-73541 — Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet dra…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73541</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZenHive mpp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas &amp;lt;= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZenHive mpp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas &amp;lt;= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73541</guid>
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