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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:37:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-77696 — Timing Side-Channel in SM2 Signature Generation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77696</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenSSL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic
on secret values, forming a timing side-channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn
information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures
can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the
private key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using
variable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so
the time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values,
forming a timing side-channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all
platforms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FIPS Impact: no
SM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenSSL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic
on secret values, forming a timing side-channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn
information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures
can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the
private key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using
variable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so
the time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values,
forming a timing side-channel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all
platforms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FIPS Impact: no
SM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-77696</guid>
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