<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:30:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-78038 — Job argument injection via :args overrides primary_key and tenant in AshOban</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-78038</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_oban&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user whose input reaches the :args option of AshOban.build_trigger/3 to retarget an update or destroy trigger at another record, including across tenants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;build_trigger/3 builds the trusted job arguments with atom keys (:primary_key, :tenant, :action_arguments) and merges the caller&amp;#39;s :args underneath so the trusted values win on collision. Because Oban job arguments round-trip through JSON, the caller&amp;#39;s keys arrive as strings, so Map.merge sees no collision and both keys survive. When the job is persisted the JSON object is de-duplicated keeping the last (string) key, and the worker reads the caller&amp;#39;s value. The documentation describes :args as unable to affect the action, so an application that forwards user input into it for uniqueness scoping is exposed to authorization bypass and tenant isolation breaks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_oban: from 0.2.5 before 0.8.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_oban&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash_oban allows a user whose input reaches the :args option of AshOban.build_trigger/3 to retarget an update or destroy trigger at another record, including across tenants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;build_trigger/3 builds the trusted job arguments with atom keys (:primary_key, :tenant, :action_arguments) and merges the caller&amp;#39;s :args underneath so the trusted values win on collision. Because Oban job arguments round-trip through JSON, the caller&amp;#39;s keys arrive as strings, so Map.merge sees no collision and both keys survive. When the job is persisted the JSON object is de-duplicated keeping the last (string) key, and the worker reads the caller&amp;#39;s value. The documentation describes :args as unable to affect the action, so an application that forwards user input into it for uniqueness scoping is exposed to authorization bypass and tenant isolation breaks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_oban: from 0.2.5 before 0.8.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-78038</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
