https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:14:58 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81853 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ash-project ash_admin</p> <p>Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.</p> <p>AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource&#39;s primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: &#34;guess&#34;} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.</p> <p>This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ash-project ash_admin</p> <p>Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.</p> <p>AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource&#39;s primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: &#34;guess&#34;} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.</p> <p>This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81853