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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 01:42:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-82564 — Identity tool filter in AshAi accepts operator maps, allowing update or destroy of unidentified records</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82564</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {&amp;#34;public_ref&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;not_eq&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;own-ref&amp;gt;&amp;#34;}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {&amp;#34;public_ref&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;not_eq&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;own-ref&amp;gt;&amp;#34;}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82564</guid>
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