https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:12:08 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82672 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> elixir-mint mint</p> <p>Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (&#39;HTTP Request/Response Smuggling&#39;) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.</p> <p>Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response&#39;s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.</p> <p>This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> elixir-mint mint</p> <p>Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (&#39;HTTP Request/Response Smuggling&#39;) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.</p> <p>Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response&#39;s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.</p> <p>This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82672